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THE “PRINTED PUBLICATION” BAR AFTER 
KLOPFENSTEIN: HAS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CHANGED 
THE WAY PROFESSORS SHOULD TALK ABOUT 
SCIENCE? 
Sean B. Seymore* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Lurking around every patent is the would-be infringer, who waits 
for the right moment to pounce.1  The infringer often targets university-
owned patents as his prey because faculty inventors are ill-trained in the 
patent laws,2 particularly the statutory loss-of-right provisions.3  The 
 
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2006; Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 2001; M.S.Chem., 
Georgia Institute of Technology, 1996; B.S., University of Tennessee, 1993.  Current address: Foley 
Hoag LLP, Seaport World Trade Center West, 155 Seaport Blvd., Boston, MA 02210.  E-mail: 
seymore@alumni.nd.edu. 
 1. An infringer, however, runs the risk of having to pay treble damages and attorney’s fees if 
the court finds his conduct willful.  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (permitting treble damages); id. 
§ 285 (permitting reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing party); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964) (explaining the deterrent effect of statutory provisions).  
So when “‘a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s [presumptively valid] patent rights, he 
has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing,’ including 
‘the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any 
possible infringing activity.’”  Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 
383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 
717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining the doctrine of willful infringement)). 
 2. See Sean B. Seymore, My Patent, Your Patent, or Our Patent? Inventorship Disputes 
within Academic Research Groups, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 166 (2006) (“[T]he university 
cannot rely on professors to make proper [patent-related] decisions . . . [because] professors rarely 
understand and appreciate patent law. . . .”); Sean B. Seymore, How Does My Work Become Our 
Work? Dilution of Authorship in Scientific Papers, and the Need for the Academy to Obey 
Copyright Law, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 39 (2006), available at http://law.richmond.edu/ 
jolt/v12i3/article11.pdf (“[U]niversities need to train science faculty and graduate students in 
intellectual property fundamentals.”). 
 3. An inventor cannot receive a patent if the invention was “described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for 
patent in the United States.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  This loss-of-right provision, the “statutory bar,” 
prevents an inventor from obtaining a patent if he delays in filing, even if the product was new and 
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would-be infringer has in his arsenal the “printed publication” bar of 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b).4  If the infringer can prove that, before the critical date,5 
the professor disclosed the invention to a group of interested persons 
using a reference6 that falls under the broad ambit of a “printed 
publication,”7 the professor either jeopardizes his own right to a patent8 
or compromises the value of an existing patent.9  The § 102(b) printed 
publication bar terrifies university technology transfer offices10 (TTOs) 
 
patentable when it was invented: 
[The loss-of-right provisions,] [s]ections 102(b), 102(c) and 102(d)[,] all relate to events 
and acts by the inventor or by other persons prior to the date when the inventor applies 
for a patent.  The point of a statutory bar is that an inventor of a product or process that 
may have been new and patentable at the time of invention can lose the right to obtain a 
patent by tardiness in applying for a patent. 
1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2006). 
  “A person who invents a product . . . that meets the conditions of patentability (statutory 
subject matter, novelty, utility, nonobviousness) is under no categorical duty to file an application 
for the patent within any certain period of time;” but once an inventor’s action triggers a § 102(b) 
event, he “must apply for a patent within the prescribed period or be forever barred from obtaining a 
patent.”  2 CHISUM supra, § 6.02 (explaining the § 102(b) statutory bar). 
 4. For the statutory text, see supra note 3. 
 5. The critical date “[is] defined as one year prior to the U.S. filing date to which the 
application was entitled.”  Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 
525 U.S. 55 (1998).  Therefore, Congress “has not made the existence of a ‘printed publication’ a 
bar to the grant of a patent under all circumstances.  Congress has given applicants a period of grace 
of one year after the invention has been described in a printed publication for the applicant to file 
his application.”  In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1958). 
 6. Professor Donald Chisum defines a “prior art” reference as follows: 
The prior art constitutes those references which may be used to determine the novelty 
and nonobviousness of claimed subject matter in a patent application or patent.  It 
includes both documentary sources (patents and publications from anywhere in the 
world) and nondocumentary sources (things known, used or invented in the United 
States).  A reference must be in the art pertinent to the invention in question or in an 
analogous art.  A reference must be dated prior to the applicant’s date of invention or, in 
the case of statutory bars, more than one year prior to his date of application for a patent. 
1 CHISUM supra note 3, Glossary, G1-18. 
 7. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 8. In the United States, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 9. The accused or would-be infringer will always determine the existence of any statutory 
bars at an early stage in litigation because, “in terms of securing and organizing evidence, [the 
inquiry involves] a single and basic factual determination.”  2 HORWITZ & HORWITZ, PATENT 
LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS § 6.03 (2006).  Therefore, § 102(b) statutory bars are also a 
common ground for summary judgment.  See id. § 6.05[5][c] (“Proof of an act by the patentee 
resulting in the loss of his right to patent is the most promising situation for summary judgment 
because the required showing probably will not be technical in nature.”). 
 10. “University technology transfer is the process by which a university commercializes 
inventions and innovations developed by university faculty and researchers.  Technology transfer 
takes many forms, from patent licensing to forming start-up ventures on campus.”  Mark L. Gordon, 
University Controlled or Owned Technology: The State of Commercialization and 
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because, in academic research, patentability and validity “can be 
derailed by the kind of disclosure that is a normal part of routine 
scientific discourse.”11 
In In re Klopfenstein,12 the Federal Circuit held that a fourteen-slide 
lecture, which was ultimately displayed as a poster, was sufficient to 
trigger the “printed publication” bar, even though hard copies of the 
presentation were neither disseminated nor indexed in a library.13  
Klopfenstein is particularly important in the realm of academic science 
because it suggests that under certain circumstances a run-of-the-mill 
research talk can become a § 102(b) “printed publication” and trigger the 
one-year clock.14 
Some commentators view Klopfenstein as a departure from prior 
precedent,15 particularly the college thesis cases,16 which suggested that 
dissemination or library indexing of at least one copy was required to 
trigger the § 102(b) clock.17  In this Article, I argue that Klopfenstein is 
consistent with prior § 102(b) case law.   The Federal Circuit has always 
recognized that “prior public disclosure of the substance of an invention 
serves as the most fundamental bar to the ability of an inventor to obtain 
patent protection.”18  Thus, Klopfenstein shows that the Federal Circuit, 
like its predecessor court,19 focuses the printed publication inquiry on 
whether the presentation is sufficiently accessible to the interested 
 
Recommendations, 30 J.C. & U.L. 641, 641 (2004). 
 11. Jeff Rothenberg, A Scientific Presentation Can Defeat Patentability, THE BUSINESS REV., 
Dec. 2, 2005, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/stories/2005/12/05/ 
smallb3.html?page=2. 
 12. 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 13. Id. at 1352.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Disclosure and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents 
in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221 (2006) (“The decision is significant because 
previous caselaw had required the distribution of at least some copies or the indexing and 
cataloguing of at least one physical copy of a reference before such information would be 
considered patent-defeating prior art.”); Cindy Ricks, Note, The “Printed Publication” Bar As 
Applied to Presentations Made at Scientific Conferences, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 843, 861 (2005) (“The 
court’s decision in Klopfenstein appears to be a departure, or at least a change in direction, from 
previous case law regarding the printed publication bar of section 102(b).”). 
 16. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 17. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 18. Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Report to the 
Secretary of Commerce 47 (1992). 
 19. The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”) ceased to exist on September 
30, 1982.  The successor court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal 
Circuit”), adopted the C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent.  South Corp. v. United States, 
690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (“As a foundation for decision in this and 
subsequent cases in this court, we deem it fitting, necessary, and proper to adopt [the holdings of the 
C.C.P.A.] as precedent.”). 
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public.20  The key question for universities is how Klopfenstein will 
affect the way that science professors talk about science. 
To answer this question, Part II explores the conflict between a 
professor’s need to disseminate research and the university’s potential 
interest in seeking patent protection.  The research talk, one of the most 
important forums for communication in the science community, is an 
objective measure of research success and scholarship.  When a 
professor produces a patentable invention, university TTOs must balance 
the professor’s need to discuss the research against the strict statutory 
requirement to file within one year of public disclosure.21  If a professor 
inadvertently triggers the § 102(b) clock, the university may lose patent 
protection.22 
Part III describes the policy and statutory basis for the § 102(b) 
printed publication bar as interpreted by the Federal Circuit and its 
predecessor court.23  Contrary to other commentators, this Article 
suggests that the court’s jurisprudence has remained constant.  
Admittedly, however, the Federal Circuit has held that the inventor can 
trigger the printed publication bar without disseminating physical copies, 
but the focus of the inquiry remains the same: sufficient accessibility to 
the interested public.24  
In Part IV, this Article applies the four factors articulated by the 
Klopfenstein court25 which aid in the § 102(b) printed publication 
inquiry to academic research talks.  Although the Federal Circuit has 
 
 20. Compare In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“[W]e are convinced that the 
contents of the application were sufficiently accessible to the public and to persons skilled in the 
pertinent art to qualify as a ‘printed publication.’”) with In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (“The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to mean that before the 
critical date the reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the 
art . . . .”) and In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e must consider 
several factors relevant to the facts of this case before determining whether or not [the reference] 
was sufficiently publicly accessible in order to be considered a ‘printed publication’ under 
§ 102(b).”). 
 21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 23. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 24. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). According to the court, a given 
reference is “publicly accessible” if 
[U]pon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise 
made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject 
matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and 
comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further 
research or experimentation. 
Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting I.C.E. Corp. v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 250 F.Supp. 738, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
 25. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350. 
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suggested that a lecture that includes a transient display of visual aids is 
less likely to be considered a “printed publication” for § 102(b) purposes 
than lengthier displays,26 this Part concludes that the run-of-the-mill 
research talk, which relies heavily on visual aids, cannot survive a 
Klopfenstein analysis. 
Part V explores how professors, with proper planning, can discuss 
their research without destroying patentability.  First, an inventor can 
timely file a provisional patent application, which will nullify § 102(b) if 
done properly.  An inadequate or untimely filing, however, can create a 
trap for the unwary that may bar patentability.  Second, universities can 
create an environment that gives faculty a reason to care about 
patentability issues.  For example, universities should give professors a 
stake in the outcome, financial or otherwise, by encouraging and 
rewarding faculty entrepreneurialism.  Therefore I assert that § 102(b) 
issues that arise in the academic context are best handled through 
managerial decision making; not through changing the patent laws. 
II.  RESEARCH TALKS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND THE CONFLICT 
A.  The Scientific Talk: A Piece of the Publish or Perish Puzzle 
The scientific research talk “has become one of the most important 
communication forums for the scientific community.”27  An invitation to 
speak, like journal publications and external funding, is another indicator 
of a professor’s success in research.28  Giving a talk at a research 
conference, university, corporation, or national laboratory is an objective 
measure of career advancement that may serve as an element in the 
promotion and tenure calculus.29  Indeed, a young professor must leave 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Mark Schoeberl & Brian Toon, Ten Secrets to Giving a Good Scientific Talk, 
http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cms/agu/scientific_talk.html (last visited March 22, 2007). 
 28. Graeme Eisenhofer, Scientific Productivity: Waning Importance for Career Development 
of Today’s Scientist?, (Sept. 9, 1996) http://his.com/graeme/pandp.html (“It is essential that . . . the 
young scientist . . . appreciate the importance of this form of interpersonal communication for career 
advancement.”). 
 29. Universities tend to list the criteria for promotion and tenure explicitly in faculty 
handbooks.  For example: 
The performance of a faculty member in research is evaluated both qualitatively and 
quantitatively (e.g., numbers, impact factor, citations, etc.) based on . . . refereed articles 
published in recognized technical journals . . .; competitive research grants from external 
organizations of national stature . . .; patents awarded . . .; presentations made at 
international, national or regional technical meetings and invited seminars (universities, 
industry, and government laboratories) . . . . 
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the laboratory and ride the seminar circuit in order “to facilitate 
communication of results and initiate contact with other scientists.”30  
The success of academic scientists, therefore, “often depends on how 
quickly and how often they present their inventions to the rest of the 
scientific community.”31 
Although the audience is most concerned with the substance of the 
talk, visual aids are essential.32  Without a doubt, the speaker must 
disclose his results with enough evidentiary support to convince a highly 
skeptical audience33 that his research results are true and capable of 
repetition.34  Earning the respect of one’s peers weighs heavily in the 
“publish or perish” calculus.35 
 
Criteria and Procedures on Faculty Evaluation for Tenure & Promotion, http://www.ksu.edu/ 
academicservices/add/eng/chem/echm_promo_04_2003.pdf (last visited April 25, 2003).  See also 
Promotion & Tenure Policies & Procedures of the Department of Biological Sciences at Mississippi 
State University, http://www.msstate.edu/dept/academic_affairs/BioSciP&Tdocument.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2005) (“The research activities of an individual being considered for promotion to 
Professor should be represented by an established research program with demonstrated continuous 
productivity and recognition of this program on a national and international level.  Such recognition 
could include . . . invited seminars at research universities . . . .”). 
 30. Eisenhofer, supra note 28. 
 31. Noera Ayaz, Is a Scientific Presentation Disclosing A Later-Claimed Invention an 
Invalidating “Printed Publication” Under 35 U.S.C. Section 102(b)? Oct. 18, 2004, 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/infocenter/publications. 
 32. The form and content of research seminars varies among professors.  Whereas some 
science professors still use overhead transparencies, slides, or chalk, others use graphical 
presentation software.  See generally CLIFF I. DAVIDSON & SUSAN A. AMBROSE, THE NEW 
PROFESSOR’S HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO TEACHING & RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 
159-70 (describing how a new professor should present a talk on research results). 
 33. Many scientists adopt Sturgeon’s law that ninety-five percent of biomedical science, 
including research, is “crap.”  Peter J. McDonnell M.D., Are You Skeptical of the Latest Peer-
Reviewed Results? OPTHALMOLOGY TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at 4, available at 
http://www.ophthalmologytimes.com/opthalmologytimes/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=306. 
 34. See, e.g., Robert Speth, Bad Science, Fraud, and Peer Review, CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY, 
Jan. 23, 2006, at 15 (attributing sloppy science and scientific fraud to lapses in the peer review 
process). 
There is increasing concern that most current published research findings are false.  The 
probability that a research claim is true may depend on study power and bias, the number 
of other studies on the same question, and, importantly, the ratio of true to no 
relationships among the relationships probed in each scientific field. 
John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, PLOS MEDICINE, August 
2005, at e124, available at http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document& 
doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124.  In many scientific fields, “claimed research findings may 
often be simply accurate measures of the prevailing bias.”  Id. 
 35. “Of course, the would be up and coming scientist must have the necessary oral 
communication skills and some good material to present to warrant an invited presentation.  Here 
again is the importance of scientific productivity and the need to link this to opportunities of 
exposure and promotion at meetings, symposia, and lecture series.”  Eisenhofer, supra note 28. 
6
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B.  Faculty-Generated Inventions: The Key to Technology Transfer 
Research universities have created technology transfer offices 
(TTOs) which strive to “transfer” faculty-generated inventions from the 
laboratory to the world of commerce.36  In light of the ever-increasing 
costs of conducting research and the uncertainly of federal funding, 
these collaborations allow universities to generate revenue through 
patent licensing.37  Nevertheless, in fact, licenses generate only a 
relatively small percentage of a university’s income.38  Universities 
derive “second-order” benefits from technology transfer, which include 
 
 36. The Patent and Trademark Act Amendments Act of 1980, commonly known as the Bayh-
Dole Act, sparked the growth of university technology transfer, by allowing universities and other 
non-profit organizations to retain title to inventions which emerge from federally-sponsored 
research.  See Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 6, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 200-212 (2006)).  Through this legislation, Congress sought “to promote the utilization of 
inventions arising from federally supported research[,]” “to encourage maximum participation of 
small business firms in federally supported research[,]” “to promote collaboration between 
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities.”  Id. at § 200.  Professor 
Mireles explains the integral role of technology transfer at the modern research university as 
follows: 
Most, if not all, universities have developed policies directed toward research and 
development collaborations between private industry and the university.  Those policies 
attempt to strike a balance between the desire to use university research to bring products 
to market, create revenue streams for the university, which generate additional funding 
for university research, and maintain the ability of university researchers to pursue basic 
research.  The policies also state the university’s stance toward university-private 
industry licensing and define the rights and duties of the inventor, the university, and the 
outside entity.  In addition to a policy, most universities will establish administrative 
procedures for evaluating prospective patented inventions, obtaining and securing 
patents and other intellectual property rights, and transferring rights to entities outside 
the university. 
Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the 
Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 161 (2004) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 37. See Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-
Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 453-56 (1997) (providing a 
detailed history and economic analysis on technology transfer at universities). 
 38. Id. at 453 (“‘Most people who are even reasonably optimistic think it’s highly unlikely 
that very many institutions will ever realize more than five percent of their research budget from 
this source.’”)  Id. (citing Universities Across U.S. Invent a Way to Bring in More Money, Cashing 
in on Research, Omaha World-Herald, May 30, 1995, at 2); Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From 
“Publish or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”: Revenues From University Technology Transfer and the 
§ 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 97 (1996) (“An oft-quoted rule of thumb 
suggests that of ten laboratory inventions, only one will receive a patent; only one in ten patents will 
be licensed by a company, and only one in ten licenses results in more than $25,000 per year in 
income.”) (citation omitted); Joshua B. Powers, Between Lab Bench and Marketplace: the Pitfalls 
of Technology Transfer, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED., May 22, 2006, at B18 (“[Research] shows 
that after subtracting their operating costs — i.e., expenditures for patenting, staffing, and overhead 
— more than half of universities consistently lose money on technology transfer.”). 
7
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fulfilling a professor’s desire to see tangible results of his research, 
allowing professors to engage in applied rather than basic research, 
creating university-owned startups, and fulfilling the university’s 
mission to disseminate knowledge for the public good.39 
Additionally, technology transfer alters the relationship between 
academic research and commerce, which changes faculty behavior and 
the culture of academic research.40  For example, a professor “who may 
previously have looked to coauthorship or journal citation, now seeks 
[listing on a patent] as coinventor or seeks receipt of a portion of the 
licensing agreement revenues.”41  Indeed, commercial interest in a 
professor’s invention is a strong indicator of creative scholarship,42 
which is “proven” if the invention is ultimately licensed.43  Therefore, 
patent licensing raises many questions about academic freedom, research 
 
 39. See Dueker, supra note 37, at 468-69 (describing the “second-order” benefits of 
technology transfer). 
 40. See generally Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for 
Developing Countries, 46 IDEA 261, 266-67 (2006) (discussing the effect of increased patenting 
and commercialization on U.S. universities’ research agenda); Harvey Brooks, Current Criticisms 
of Research Universities, in THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT 231, 247 
(Jonathan R. Cole et. al. eds., 1994) (“[Some critics suggest that] universities have already moved 
much too far toward adopting the culture of the marketplace and . . . fear that business interests and 
values and rent-seeking behavior are undermining the distinctive academic culture and its potential 
contribution to national well-being . . . .”). 
 41. Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 43 n.167 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 42. See, e.g., Boston Univ. College of Engineering, Faculty Expectations § 2.6 (May 2001), 
available at http://www.bu.edu/eng/facforms/FACULTY%20EXPECTATIONS%20Final.pdf (May 
2001) (“Technology transfer, i.e. the moving of ideas from the laboratory to the world of commerce 
in a useful form, is an important part of knowledge dissemination and is therefore another indication 
of success in research.”). 
 43. Some universities consider patents in promotion and tenure evaluations: 
[A]ll faculty . . . are expected to engage in scholarly endeavors and produce works to be 
judged by their peers, both inside and outside the University.  Peer reviews may take 
several forms, but acceptance of work should provide evidence of some wider 
recognition of the work’s value.  Acceptance of a manuscript by the editor of a refereed 
professional journal certainly satisfies these conditions, but so does issuance of a patent 
or other protection of intellectual property . . . .  [Emphasis added.] 
New Mexico State University, Guidelines for Promotion and Tenure of Academic Programs and 
AES Faculty (Oct. 29, 1996), http://www.cahe.nmsu.edu/employee/internal_docs/AESpt.html.  See 
also Stevens Institute of Technology; The Faculty P&T Committee White Paper on Promotion, 
Tenure, and Mentoring § 5.6 (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.stevens-tech.edu/main/home/faculty 
(“Candidates who bring forward creative inventions or are granted significant patents . . . need to be 
recognized.  Such accomplishments may count as evidence of scholarly activity.  . . .  It should be 
possible, therefore, for the exceptional candidate to be recommended for tenure and/or promotion 
substantially on the basis of his or her contributions as an inventor.”).  But see New Mexico State 
University, supra, “[P]ublication in refereed scholarly journals precedes other evidence of 
professional stature.” 
8
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priorities, incentives, and the need to preserve “open science.”44 
Universities promulgate patent policies that attempt to prevent 
inadvertent § 102(b)-triggering events.45  The risk of the statutory bar 
“helps explain the precautions and gyrations that universities and 
inventors must go through, and that are, in certain cases, the cause of 
potential conflicts between academic researchers and commercial 
sponsors and licensees.”46 
C.  The Conflict 
Universities must balance the need to allow science professors to 
disseminate their research with the need to protect the institution’s 
interest in patent licensing.  This balancing demonstrates the tension 
between patent protection and the dissemination of information: 
Scientific researchers and academics are often under a great deal of 
pressure to publish or present their findings soon after making their 
discoveries.  Indeed, scientists’ success often depends on how quickly 
and how often they present their inventions to the rest of the scientific 
community.  These strong incentives to promulgate their findings at an 
 
 44. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 305 (2003) (describing the prominent role of TTOs in university 
decision-making).  Commercialization and licensing decisions often are made by technology 
transfer officers who are not themselves academics.  Id.  TTOs “see their primary job as bringing 
licensing revenue into the university.  Their ability to bring in license revenue may also be an 
important criterion by which their performance is assessed.  Adherence to norms of open science is 
at odds with this primary mission and tempts technology transfer professionals to depart from the 
form whenever they think a particular material may have commercial value.”  Id. at 306 (footnote 
omitted). 
 45. For example, Georgetown University prints its patent policy in the faculty handbook: 
The University Inventor is subject to many pressures in the academic community to 
publish materials describing research.  Premature publication may, however, adversely 
affect the public use and benefits of scientific data.  Ideas promulgated in the literature 
without adequate prior protection may ultimately be lost to the public good due to their 
limited commercial potential.  It is important for the University Inventor to be aware of 
the potential harm of premature publication, which severely undermines the patentability 
of an invention.  Because of the great costs associated with bringing a product to market, 
companies are usually willing to develop technology only if it is protected by patents. 
. . . . 
In general, a patent owner in the United States has a grace period of one year to file an 
application after disclosure through publication or public presentation of the nature of 
the invention.  If the U.S. patent application is filed prior to any publication or 
presentation, worldwide patent rights are preserved for one year from the U.S. filing 
date. 
Georgetown University Faculty Handbook, § XIII.c (1999), available at http://www.georgetown. 
edu/facultysenate/handbook.html. 
 46. Dueker, supra note 37, at 472 (discussing the § 102(b) printed publication bar). 
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early date may cause problems for inventors under U.S. and foreign 
patent law when they seek patent protection for the fruits of their 
earlier-disclosed findings.47 
The actual fight is over timing;48 however, “an understanding has 
developed between universities and industry (and between TTOs and 
faculty) that publication will be delayed only for the minimum amount 
of time necessary to secure intellectual property protection.”49 
While a reasonably astute science professor recognizes that 
disclosure in a journal publication or at a research conference may 
adversely affect patentability, a professor may not know that, in light of 
Klopfenstein, an informal, run-of-the-mill research talk can also trigger 
the § 102(b) printed publication bar.50 
III. THE “PRINTED PUBLICATION” BAR 
The Patent Act51 contains a loss-of-right provision, 35 U.S.C 
§ 102(b), which precludes patentability for the inventor’s own conduct.52  
An inventor cannot receive a patent if the invention was “described in a 
printed publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .”53  
Therefore, a delay in filing the patent application leads to a “statutory 
bar.”54 
 
 47. Ayaz, supra note 31. 
 48. Dueker, supra note 37, at 473. 
[T]he one-year grace period [available in the U.S.] is not available in many foreign 
countries.  Thus, any prefiling publication . . . may result in the loss of foreign rights.  
These considerations have lead [sic] both industrial sponsors and university TTOs to 
attempt to delay publication to allow for patent filings. 
Id. 
 49. Id. “‘[A]lthough a good deal of attention is given to this issue, publication delay 
provisions are rarely sticking points in contract negotiations.  They present problems only with 
unsophisticated sponsors who are not familiar with university contract practices.’”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 50. See infra Part IV. 
 51. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000). 
 52. Id. § 102(b). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Patent practitioners are always mindful of the so-called “statutory bar:” 
Disclosure to the public of one’s own work constitutes a bar to the grant of a patent 
claiming the subject matter so disclosed . . . only when the disclosure occurred more than 
one year prior to the date of the application, that is, when the disclosure creates a one-
year time bar, frequently termed a “statutory bar,” to the application under § 102(b). 
In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 454 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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A.  Policy Considerations 
The printed publication bar55 operates to deny the benefit of patent 
protection to an inventor who has already made his invention accessible 
to the public by his own conduct.56  The Supreme Court views the patent 
system as “a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation 
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in 
return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”57  
Professor Durham explains the threefold rationale for § 102(b) and how 
the statute strikes a balance between the needs of the inventor and the 
public as follows: 
First, and most generally, [§ 102(b)] encourages diligence by 
penalizing inventors who are lazy . . . or who for some other reason 
delay in filing a patent application.  Second, it prevents the public from 
being misled where the availability of the invention to the public, 
without evidence that the inventor intends to obtain a patent, might 
create the impression that the invention is up for grabs.  [Third], it 
prevents what could be an unwarranted extension of the inventor’s 
monopoly powers . . . [which] could prevent potential competitors 
from daring to compete.  On the other hand, an inventor does need a 
certain amount of time to . . . judge whether [the invention] is worth 
pursuing, and prepare a patent application.  . . .  [The one-year grace 
period] effectively balances the needs of the inventor against the needs 
of the public.58 
Section 102(b) “serves as a limiting provision, both excluding ideas 
that are in the public domain from patent protection and confining the 
 
 55. “The ‘printed publication’ bar appears to have been first enacted in § 7 (on examination) 
of the Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, July 4, 1836.  Section 6 of the Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318, listing 
defenses, used the expression ‘described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery of 
the patentee.’”  In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 56. See LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (“The general purpose behind section 102(b) bars is to require inventors to assert with due 
diligence their right to a patent through the prompt filing of a patent application.”).  Section 102(b) 
“establishes a one year grace period based on publication or public use or sale, after which an 
inventor is barred from access to the patent system.”  Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 
148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  But section 102(b), “unlike § 102(a), is primarily concerned 
with the policy that encourages an inventor to enter the patent system promptly, while recognizing a 
one year period of public knowledge or use . . . before the patent application must be filed.”  Id. at 
1370. 
 57. Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). 
 58. ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 117-18 (2004) (citing 
LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1071) (discussing the general purpose and policies behind the § 102(b) bars); 
Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (same); and Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(same). 
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duration of the monopoly to the statutory term.”59  To allow the inventor 
to withdraw, as the subject matter of a patent, that which is already in 
possession of the public would frustrate the patent laws.60  As 
consideration for the patent grant, “something must be given to the 
public which it did not have before[,]”61 but if the public already 
possesses that “something,” or if it is already publicly accessible, there is 
a failure of consideration.62  When the lack of consideration occurs 
before issuance, the patent application will be rejected; when afterward, 
the patent is subject to invalidation.63 
B.  Statutory Construction 
1.  Overview 
“The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to 
mean that before the critical date64 the reference must have been 
sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art; dissemination 
and public accessibility are the keys to the legal determination whether a 
prior art reference was ‘published.’”65  The proponent of the printed 
 
 59. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64. 
 60. See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (“Sections 
102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection knowledge that 
is already available to the public.  They express a congressional determination that the creation of a 
monopoly in such information would not only serve no socially useful purpose, but would in fact 
injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use.”); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (“As this court pointed out in In re Bayer, [568 F.2d 1357, 1359 (C.C.P.A. 1978)], 
the printed publication provision was designed to prevent withdrawal by an inventor, as the subject 
matter of a patent, of that which was already in the possession of the public.”).  In 1958, the 
C.C.P.A. provided an expansive discussion of the policy underlying the printed publication bar: 
An inventor does not become entitled to a patent merely by exercising his creative 
faculties in the production of an art or instrument.  The consideration for the grant of his 
exclusive privilege is the benefit which he confers upon the public by placing in their 
hands a means through the use of which their wants may be supplied. 
In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 623 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (quoting 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF 
PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS, at 305 (1890)).  So “unless the public so derives benefit, [and] 
unless the patentee, by his disclosure, adds to the sum of human knowledge, the grant of a patent 
would, in fact, be a monopoly within the above definition, and the policy of the patent laws would 
be frustrated.”  Id. 
 61. Tenney, 254 F.2d at 624. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 623.  “If the same means has been already made accessible to [the public] by the 
inventive genius . . . no benefit results to them from his inventive act and there is no consideration 
for his patent.  . . .  In order, therefore, that an invention may be patented or protected by a patent, it 
must be new, that is, bestowed for the first time upon the public by the patentee.”  Id. 
 64. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 65. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Constant v. Advanced 
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publication bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence66 that prior 
to the critical date, a document “has been disseminated or otherwise 
made available to the extent that persons interested and of ordinary skill 
in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence can locate it 
and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed 
invention without need of further research or experimentation.”67  
Operation of the bar “is a legal determination based on underlying fact 
issues, and therefore must be approached on a case-by-case basis.”68  
When “no facts are in dispute, the question of whether a reference 
represents a ‘printed publication’ is a question of law.”69 
2.  What Does “Dissemination” Mean? 
The Federal Circuit does not interpret “dissemination” to require 
the distribution of physical copies, which is consistent with the court’s 
construction of “printed publication” as a unitary concept.70  The court 
 
Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892 (1988)). 
 66. See, e.g., Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 936-37 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (“The district court, referring to the uncertainties of public access[,] . . .  found that Datapoint 
had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence facts requiring a conclusion that these 
documents were sufficient as prior publications . . . [because the court] was unable to find that 
anyone could have had access to the documents by the exercise of reasonable diligence.  . . .  [We 
affirm].”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 520 (1990); Norian Corp v. Stryker Corp., 252 F.Supp.2d 945, 954 
(N.D.Cal. 2002) (“[The proponent] had to prove that the abstract qualified as a printed publication, 
including public accessibility, by clear and convincing evidence.”), rev’d on other grounds, 363 
F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he lack of substantial evidence of actual availability . . . 
adequately supports the court’s conclusion that dissemination of the Abstract was not established.”).  
A patent is presumed valid; thus, the challenger must come forward with clear and convincing 
evidence of invalidity.  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002). 
 67. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting In re 
Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).  Cf. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“The proponent of the publication bar must show that prior to the critical date the reference was 
sufficiently accessible, at least to the public interested in the art, so that such a one by examining the 
reference could make the claimed invention without further research or experimentation.”). 
 68. Hall, 781 F.2d at 899 (citing Wyer, 655 F.2d. at 227).  See also Norian Corp. v. Stryker 
Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Whether a document is a prior publication [for 
§ 102(b) purposes] is a question of law.”); In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(“The decision whether a particular reference is a printed publication ‘must be approached on a 
case-by-case basis.’”) (citing Wyer, 655 F.2d. at 227). 
 69. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 
1159).  “Questions of law appealed from a Board [of Patent Appeals & Interferences] decision are 
reviewed de novo.  . . .  [When] there are no factual disputes between the parties . . . the legal issue 
of whether [a] reference is a ‘printed publication’ will be reviewed de novo.”  Id. at 1347-48. 
 70. The C.C.P.A. settled any dichotomy between “printed” and “publication” in 1981: 
‘The traditional process of “printing” is no longer the only process synonymous with 
“publication.”  The emphasis, therefore, should be public dissemination of the document, 
and its availability and accessibility to persons skilled in the subject matter or art.’ 
We agree that “printed publication” should be approached as a unitary concept.  The 
13
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defines “dissemination” in its literal sense, which is more in line with the 
purpose of the statute.71  In In re Wyer, the C.C.P.A. determined that an 
Australian patent application on microfilm qualified as a printed 
publication even without proof of an actual viewing or dissemination of 
the reference.72  The key fact for § 102(b) purposes was that “the 
contents of the application were sufficiently accessible to the public and 
to persons skilled in the pertinent art . . . .”73  Therefore, dissemination of 
physical copies can serve as evidence of public accessibility, which is 
the “touchstone” to whether a reference is a printed publication.74 
The Federal Circuit’s literal construction of “dissemination” proved 
fatal for the applicants in Klopfenstein.75  In that case, the applicants 
presented a slide presentation at a conference, which was printed and 
displayed on poster boards for two and a half days there, and then for 
less than a day at Kansas State University.76  The Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection because 
“the full invention . . . was made publicly accessible to those of ordinary 
skill in the art by the . . . reference [before the critical date] and that this 
introduction into the public domain of disclosed material via printed 
display represented a ‘printed publication’ under [§ 102(b)].”77  Before 
the Federal Circuit, the inventors argued that the reference was not a 
printed publication because: (1) hard copies were not disseminated at the 
conference;78 and (2) the slides were neither catalogued nor indexed in a 
library database.79  The appellants relied on In re Cronyn, in which the 
 
traditional dichotomy between “printing” and “publication” is no longer valid.  Given the 
state of technology . . . the “probability of dissemination” of an item very often has little 
to do with whether or not it is “printed” in the sense of that word when it was introduced 
into the patent statutes in 1836.  In any event, interpretation of the words “printed” and 
“publication” to mean “probability of dissemination” and “public accessibility,” 
respectively, now seems to render their use in the phrase “printed publication” somewhat 
redundant. 
Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 71. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. 
 72. Wyer, 655 F.2d at 226. 
 73. Id.  For a discussion of the hypothetical skilled artisan, see Part IV.C. 
 74. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoted in Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 
363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 75. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 1347. 
 77. Id. 
 78. But if copies of the reference are made available, the reference might be a printed 
publication even if six or fewer attendees request a copy.  See Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 
F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper orally presented at a scientific meeting open 
to all persons with written copies available upon request without restriction, and actually distributed 
to six persons, is a printed publication). 
 79. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1346-47. 
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court held that the undergraduate student theses at issue were not 
§ 102(b) publications because “they had not been either catalogued or 
indexed in [any] meaningful way.”80  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the appellants’ narrow definition of “dissemination:” 
While the Cronyn court held “dissemination” to be necessary to 
finding something to be a “printed publication”, [sic] the court there 
used the word “disseminate” in its literal sense, i.e. “make widespread” 
or “to foster general knowledge of.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 656 (1993).  The court did not use the word in 
the narrower sense the appellants have employed it, which requires 
distribution of reproductions or photocopies.81 
After the panel made clear that the distribution of copies is not 
required,82 the court clarified any ambiguity in the prior case law: 
Thus, throughout our case law, public accessibility has been the 
criterion by which a prior art reference will be judged for the purposes 
of § 102(b).  Oftentimes courts have found it helpful to rely on 
distribution and indexing as proxies for public accessibility.  But when 
they have done so, it has not been to the exclusion of all other 
measures of public accessibility.  In other words, distribution and 
indexing are not the only factors to be considered in a § 102(b) 
“printed publication” inquiry.83 
So Klopfenstein introduced no substantive changes to the § 102(b) 
printed publication doctrine,84 although it reminds inventors to include 
slide presentations as prior art disclosed to the USPTO during 
prosecution.85  Nevertheless, the decision caused TTOs and other 
 
 80. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 81. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348 n.3. 
 82. Id. at 1348.  “Even if the cases cited by the appellants relied on inquiries into distribution 
and indexing to reach their holdings, they do not limit this court to finding something to be a 
‘printed publication’ only when there is distribution and/or indexing.”  Id. 
 83. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added). 
 84. Some commentators read the case differently.  See, e.g., Katherine E. White, An Efficient 
Way to Improve Patent Quality for Plant Varieties, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 79, 91 (2004) 
(“The holding in Klopfenstein further reveals the Federal Circuit’s willingness to look at prior art 
more expansively than in the past.”); Bagley, supra note 15, at 221 (“[O]ther judicial, legislative, 
and commercial developments point toward an even bleaker future for academic disclosure in the 
sciences.  . . . Klopfenstein seems sure to result in a further stifling of scholarly discourse prior to the 
filing of patent applications.”); Ricks, supra note 15, at 861 (“[T]he court’s decision has serious 
implications for future applications of the printed publication doctrine, particularly as it relates to 
those who make presentations at professional conferences or trade shows.”). 
 85. An applicant’s failure to disclose material information to the USPTO during patent 
prosecution may lead to a finding of inequitable conduct, which can render a patent unenforceable.  
See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To 
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observers to panic because they mistakenly understood the “college 
thesis cases” to stand for the proposition that § 102(b) required the 
distribution of physical copies.86  Klopfenstein does show, however, that 
the Federal Circuit, like its predecessor court, will not subordinate 
substance to form in the § 102(b) analysis.87  The focus of the inquiry 
 
avoid a finding of inequitable conduct, doubts concerning whether information is material should 
be resolved in favor of disclosure.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  Inequitable conduct is a 
defense raised by an accused infringer in almost every patent case.  See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Lab., 
Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he habit of charging 
inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”) (quoting 
Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  To determine if 
inequitable conduct has occurred, the court applies a two-step factual analysis followed by a 
balancing test: 
Applicants for patents have a duty to prosecute patents in the PTO with candor and good 
faith, including a duty to disclose information known to the applicants to be material to 
patentability.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2004); see also Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 
1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  A breach of this duty may constitute inequitable conduct, 
which can arise from an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to 
disclose material information, or submission of false material information, coupled with 
an intent to deceive or mislead the PTO.  A party asserting that a patent is unenforceable 
due to inequitable conduct must prove materiality and intent by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) [(en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989)].  Once threshold findings of 
materiality and intent are established, the trial court must weigh them to determine 
whether the equities warrant a conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred. 
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted).  In PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., a district court found that 
an inventor intentionally misrepresented both the presence of slides at a brief conference talk and 
important dates relevant to § 102(b).  12 F.Supp.2d 69, 127-30 (D. Mass. 1998).  The Federal 
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the patent unenforceable.  
PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 86. See, e.g., Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 USPQ 252, 256 (B.P.A.I. 1937) (holding that a single 
copy of a thesis in a public library is a “printed publication”); Ex parte Hershberger, 96 USPQ 54 
(B.P.A.I. 1953) (same); In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (granting patentee’s application 
for a chemical compound because the probability of public accessibility was small since only the 
library staff and the graduate committee had access to the thesis on the critical date); In re Hall, 781 
F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a single copy of a dissertation catalogued in a library was a 
“printed publication” because it was “publicly accessible” several months before the critical date); 
In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that three undergraduate theses were 
not printed publications under § 102(b) because they had neither been catalogued nor indexed in a 
meaningful way and were not accessible to the public). 
 87. Cf. Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Report to the 
Secretary of Commerce 47 (1992).  (“[P]rior public disclosure of the substance of an invention 
serves as the most fundamental bar to the ability of an inventor to obtain patent protection.”).  The 
most famous and most cited example of an appellate court adopting the “substance over form” 
mantra in a patent case came when the Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of equivalents: 
One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or 
play, may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy.  
Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement.  To 
prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be 
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remains the same: Sufficient accessibility to the interested public.88 
IV.  CAN THE RUN-OF-THE MILL RESEARCH TALK SURVIVE A 
KLOPFENSTEIN ANALYSIS? 
A.  Overview 
Although Klopfenstein does not substantively change the § 102(b) 
inquiry,89 the Federal Circuit has “added another refinement to a series 
of cases drawing fine distinctions as to how widely academic researchers 
may promulgate their findings in collegial presentations without starting 
the one-year time clock ticking for filing a patent application (or losing 
rights in the invention) by virtue of having created a ‘printed 
publication.’”90  In Klopfenstein, the Federal Circuit held that lecture 
slides displayed in a poster presentation, which was neither distributed 
nor indexed, were nonetheless “sufficiently publicly accessible” to count 
as a § 102(b) printed publication.91  The court considered four factors in 
its analysis, which were: (1) “the length of time the display was 
exhibited;” (2) “the expertise of the target audience;” (3) “the existence 
(or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material displayed 
would not be copied;” and (4) “the simplicity or ease with which the 
material displayed could have been copied.”92 
Although many professors know that a formal presentation at a 
research conference may adversely affect patentability,93 less formal 
presentations, including “chalk talks,”94 may also trigger the § 102(b) 
 
subordinating substance to form.  It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention 
and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the 
primary purposes of the patent system. 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (emphasis added).  The 
mantra is also used in other contexts.  See, e.g., 5 ANTHONY WILLIAM DELLER, DELLER’S WALKER 
ON PATENTS § 453, at 361 (2d ed. 1972) (“Anything in tangible form that may properly be relied 
upon . . . in support of a rejection on a matter of substance, not form, of a claim in a pending 
application for patent.”) (emphasis added). 
 88. See discussion, supra note 20. 
 89. See supra Part III.B. 
 90. Ayaz, supra note 31. 
 91. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Many universities provide explicit warnings in their patent policies.  For an example, see 
supra note 45 and accompanying text (excerpting Georgetown’s patent policy, which appears in the 
faculty handbook). 
 94. A “chalk talk” is a lecture given with a piece of chalk and a clean blackboard (or a marker 
and a blank overhead transparency).  The “chalk talk” is a “less formal,” “more interactive” talk 
which gives the speaker and the audience “more opportunity to explore ideas, direction of work, and 
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printed publication bar.95  Informal research talks, like formal conference 
presentations, incorporate visual aids,96 which lie at the heart of the 
§ 102(b) analysis.97  These references often convey more useful 
information than the speaker’s words because scientists rely on diagrams 
and drawings to understand complex concepts, to visualize spatial 
relationships, and to create mental models.98  But visual aids may prove 
fatal for the unwary inventor.  If a diagram or drawing discloses the 
essential elements of the patent claim, the reference could either bar 
patentability or invalidate an issued patent.  Because informal research 
talks occur frequently in academic science and tend to follow the same 
basic form,99 professors and TTOs need to know if these presentations 
 
some perspective of the field.”  Jim Austin, You’ve Worked Hard to Get This Far, (Nov. 22, 2002), 
http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_development/previous_issues/articles/2030/you_ve_ 
worked_hard_to_get_this_far) (explaining that a faculty candidate in a science department is often 
asked to give a “chalk talk” to a mock class as part of the on-campus interview).  “Chalk talks” are 
invaluable during the question-and-answer portion of a seminar: 
In all of this we have ignored the one time-tested visual that has served scientific 
speakers for centuries: the blackboard.  In many settings, there will, of course, be no 
blackboards.  Where they are available, blackboards are most useful during the question 
and answer period that follows most talks.  Then, blackboards are invaluable to draw 
new relationships, structures, and so on, that were not included in the talk but are needed 
to illustrate answers to questions from the audience. 
IVAN VALIELA, DOING SCIENCE: DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND COMMUNICATION OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH 153-54 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). 
 95. This Article focuses on informal research talks.  For an analysis of the § 102(b) printed 
publication bar to formal science presentations at research conferences, see Ricks, supra note 15. 
 96. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing visual aids). 
 97. “Most scientific presentations use visual aids—and almost all scientific presentations are 
casual and extemporaneous.”  Schoeberl, supra note 27.  Scientific presentations with no visual aids 
are nearly nonexistent; but, nonetheless, “it is important to note that an entirely oral presentation at a 
scientific conference that includes neither slides nor copies of the presentation is without question 
not a ‘printed publication’ for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”  In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 
1345, 1349 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 98. For example, chemists use Lewis diagrams as the principal method to convey information 
about molecules.  Chemists use Lewis diagrams to explain reactivity, to predict reactive sites, to 
describe bonding, and to convey information about bonding that words cannot.  Dr. Gilbert N. 
Lewis, Dean of the College of Chemistry at the UC Berkeley and one of America’s greatest and 
most influential chemists, introduced his electron-dot diagrams to the chemistry community in 
1916.  See generally G. N. Lewis, The Atom and the Molecule, 38 J. AMER. CHEM. SOC. 762-85 
(1916) (explaining the theory that a covalent bond consists of a shared pair of electrons); G. N. 
LEWIS, VALENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF ATOMS AND MOLECULES (Chemical Catalog Co. 1923) 
(same). 
 99. Professor Chad Orzel describes how talks about synthetic organic chemistry, for example, 
invariably follow the same four-stage basic form: 
Stage One: “Here’s this thing we’re trying to make.”  This is usually accompanied by a 
picture consisting of a bunch of hexagons, and maybe a ribbon diagram or some other 
three-dimensional model.  Stage One will occasionally include an explanation of why 
they’re trying to make whatever the thing is, but don’t count on it. 
Stage Two: “Here’s the stuff we start with.”  This will include a couple of diagrams 
18
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can survive a Klopfenstein analysis.100 
B.  The “Duration of the Display” Factor 
“The duration of the display is important in determining the 
opportunity of the public in capturing, processing and retaining the 
information conveyed by the reference.”101  A court is less likely to find 
that a transient display, as compared to a lengthy display, is a printed 
publication.102  The Klopfenstein court cited Regents of the Univ. of 
California v. Howmedica,103 where the trial judge found that a transient 
display of lecture slides was not a printed publication under § 102(b), 
even if the slides described the essential elements of the patent claims.104  
At the other end of the spectrum is the reference in Klopfenstein, which 
the inventor displayed for three days.105  Howmedica and Klopfenstein 
show that the mere display of slides accompanying an oral presentation 
is not per se a “printed publication;” however, the longer a reference is 
 
showing different arrangements of hexagons.  The jargon will get pretty thick, here, but 
almost all the strange words will be names of different parts and sub-parts of molecules. 
 . . . 
Stage Three: “Here are the steps in the process.”  This will include at least one slide 
showing multiple diagrams of hexagons, with arrows between them.  The jargon will 
again be pretty thick, but here, all the strange words will refer to methods of sticking 
pieces of molecules together.  . . . 
Stage Four: “Here are some graphs to prove we ended up what we wanted.”  This is the 
stage with the greatest variety of slides.  Data graphs may include (but are not limited to) 
pictures of chart recorder traces, blobby photographs of electrophoresis gels, or pictures 
of pencil marks made on chromatography films.  You’ll also get the occasional bar graph 
or scatter plot. 
Posting of Chad Orzel of Notes Toward a User’s Guide to Synthetic Chemistry Talks to 
Scienceblogs, http://scienceblogs.com/principles/2006/03/notes_toward_a_users_guide_to.php 
(Mar. 24, 2006, 3:19 p.m.). 
 100. The Klopfenstein factors have been applied elsewhere outside of the poster presentation 
context.  See, e.g., Zhichong Gu, MercExchange v. eBay: Should Newsgroup Postings Be 
Considered Printed Publications as a Matter of Law in Patent Litigation?, 35 GOLDEN GATE U.L. 
REV. 225, 250 (2005) (analyzing the Klopfenstein factors to determine if a newsgroup is a printed 
publication under § 102(b)). 
 101. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 102. Id. at 1350-51 (“The more transient the display, the less likely it is to be considered a 
‘printed publication.’  . . .  Conversely, the longer a reference is displayed, the more likely it is to be 
considered a ‘printed publication.’”) (citation omitted). 
 103. Regents of the Univ, of California v. Howmedica, Inc., 530 F.Supp. 846, 860 (D.N.J. 
1981), aff’d, 676 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision). 
 104. Id. at 850.  Unfortunately, the district court, in its findings of fact, did not give the exact 
time that each slide was displayed during the presentation.  Id. at 848-52. 
 105. See Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he Liu reference was displayed for a total of 
approximately three days.  It was shown at the AACC meeting for approximately two and a half 
days and at the AES at Kansas State University for less than one day.”). 
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displayed, the more likely it is to trigger § 102(b).106 
Oral research talks tend to include transient displays of lecture 
slides that may last from thirty seconds to several minutes per slide.107  
The rule of thumb is to allow at least one minute per slide,108 although 
some speakers give the audience several minutes to “absorb” each 
slide.109  The actual display time depends on factors such as the 
complexity of the substantive material, font size, and whether the 
substantive content is new or background material.110  However, the 
limited duration of these lecture presentations is not dispositive.  Many 
scientists follow the “rule of three” when planning and delivering a talk: 
“[T]ell em what you’re going to tell em, tell em, and tell em what you 
told em.”111  So, to the extent that retention and comprehension are key 
factual issues, a reference displayed from thirty seconds to several 
minutes may in fact be “sufficiently accessible” to a person of ordinary 
skill in the art.112 
C.  The “Expertise of the Target Audience” Factor 
The audience’s expertise “can help determine how easily those who 
viewed it could retain the displayed material.”113  The key question is 
whether members of the intended audience possess “ordinary skill in the 
 
 106. See id. (“[T]he longer a reference is displayed, the more likely it is to be considered a 
‘printed publication.’”). 
 107. “Slides” is used in a broad sense to include 35mm slides, “slides” created with 
presentation software like Microsoft PowerPoint, and overhead transparencies. 
 108. See, e.g., Andrew S. Kane, Scientific Communication Techniques, (2003), 
http://aquaticpath.umd.edu/scicom/SciCom-handout.pdf (“Avoid using more than 1 slide per minute 
of talk, on average.”); Biology Student Handbook, Guidelines for Oral Presentations, Albertson 
College, http://www.albertson.edu/academics/biology/Resources/handbook (last visited Apr. 25, 
2006) (“A general rule of thumb—1 slide for each minute of your presentation.  Do not plan on 
including every item from your research paper in your presentation.”). 
 109. See, e.g., James C. Garland, Advice to Beginning Physics Speakers, PHYSICS TODAY, July 
1999, at 43, available at http://www.physics.ohio-state.edu/~kagan/phy596/Presentations/ 
AdviceToBeginningPhysicsSpeakers.pdf.  (“Although you needn’t adhere to hard and fast rules, as 
a practical matter you should allow several minutes for an audience to absorb each transparency.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Biology Student Handbook, supra note 108 (“Slides must be visually simple in 
order to be understood in a short time that they are to be viewed by the audience.  A good slide is 
self-explanatory when viewed for 15 to 30 seconds.  This means that axes and other lines must be 
clearly labeled with both conceptual and unit terms.  Do not use font smaller than 18-20.  Avoid 
putting too much information on your slides.”). 
 111. Bob Zink and Carla Cicero, Thoughts for Students on Oral & Poster Presentations, 
http://www.fieldmuseum.org/aou/oraltalk.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2006) (discussing the “rule of 
three”). 
 112. See infra Part IV.C. 
 113. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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art.”114  The hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art, a legal 
construct akin to the “reasonable person” used as a reference in 
negligence determinations,115 is presumed to know all of the contents of 
the relevant prior art.116  This legal construct “is a prism or lens through 
which a judge, jury, or the [Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences] 
views the prior art and the claimed invention.”117  By imposing an 
objective standard, this reference point prevents the factfinders from 
introducing their own insight or hindsight into the process.118  The 
Federal Circuit explains how to construct the hypothetical person as 
follows: 
Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in 
the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of 
problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those 
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) 
sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active 
workers in the field.119 
The hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art “would, of 
necessity have the capability of understanding the scientific and 
engineering principles applicable to the pertinent art,”120 but need not be 
“persons working in the field of the invention [who] are likely to be 
familiar with the relevant literature.”121 
 
 114. In patent law, the perspective of “one of ordinary skill in the art” is applied to judge 
obviousness, enablement, and other issues related to patentability.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 
(2000) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described 
as set forth in § 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented 
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains.”) (emphasis added); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (describing the 
factual inquires required to determine nonobviousness). 
 115. See In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing the hypothetical 
person).  The legal construct “also presumes that all prior art references in the field of the invention 
are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”  Id. 
 116. See In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he hypothetical person of 
ordinary skill in the art . . . is charged with knowledge of all the contents of the relevant prior art.”) 
(citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re 
Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 117. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1128 
(2002). 
 118. See id. 
 119. Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). 
 120. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2141.03 (8th ed., Rev. 4, Oct. 2005) 
(quoting Ex parte Hiyamizu, 10 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (B.P.A.I. 1988)). 
 121. Helefix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing a district 
court’s determination that a person of ordinary skill in the art is familiar with all of the pertinent 
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Members of the audience who are persons of ordinary skill in the 
art are more likely to retain the displayed material than those who are 
not.122  The Klopfenstein court followed the reasoning of Judge Learned 
Hand, who stated in a patent case that a reference, “however ephemeral 
its existence, may be a printed publication if it goes direct to those whose 
interests make them likely to observe and remember whatever it may 
contain that is new and useful.”123  Following this reasoning, the 
transient display of slides characteristic of a run-of-the-mill research talk 
can be a printed publication for § 102(b) purposes since members of the 
audience: (1) do not need much time to comprehend the disclosure; and 
(2) tend to remember what they have seen.  Thus, the durational prong 
and the expertise prong are extensively intertwined. 
An inventor can assume that an audience of interested scientists is 
comprised of persons of ordinary skill in the art.  The attendees often 
possess the technical knowledge, academic pedigrees, and a level of 
expertise that is commensurate in scope to that of the inventor and other 
researchers in the field.124  Indeed, the inventor’s audience most likely 
includes fellow Ph.D. scientists who understand the “type[s] of problems 
encountered in the art,” the “prior art solutions to those problems,” and 
the “sophistication of the technology.”125  Ph.D. scientists generally do 
not need much time to comprehend the disclosure and, therefore, leave 
the presentation remembering what they have seen. 
D.  The “Protective Measures” Factor 
Where professional norms entitle the patentee to a reasonable 
expectation that the information displayed will not be copied, the court is 
more reluctant to find that the reference is a printed publication.126  
 
literature). 
 122. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (determining that attendees 
at the research conference satisfied this prong because they were, objectively, persons of ordinary 
skill in the art). 
 123. Id. (quoting Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 813-14 (2d Cir. 1928)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
 124. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 364 F. Supp.2d 820, 846 (S.D. 
Ind. 2005) (stating that in a drug-related patent infringement suit, “[a] person of ordinary skill in the 
art in this case would be a scientist with a Ph.D. in medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, or a similar 
discipline”); Synbiotics Corp. v. Heska Corp., 137 F. Supp.2d 1198, 1208 (S.D.Cal. 2000) (finding 
that academic Ph.D. scientists, including the co-author of an invalidating reference, were persons of 
ordinary skill in the art in a patent infringement suit). 
 125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining how the court determines the 
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art). 
 126. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351 (“Whether a party has a reasonable expectation that the 
information it displays to the public will not be copied aids our § 102(b) inquiry.  Where 
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Although “this reluctance helps preserve the incentive for inventors to 
participate in academic presentations or discussions,”127 the court 
nonetheless encourages the inventor to take protective measures to 
create the reasonable expectation that the information will not be 
copied.128 
In the seminar context, protective measures could include a simple 
disclaimer that “inform[s] members of the viewing public that no 
copying of the information will be allowed or countenanced.”129  In 
Klopfenstein, the inventors failed to create the reasonable expectation 
because they took no protective measures to prevent note taking.130  
Because the court did not need to consider a fact situation where 
protective measures were actually taken it is difficult to elucidate the 
contours of reasonable expectation.  Protective measures may simply 
create an inference which the patent examiner or infringer can rebut with 
evidence of actual copying.  The reasonableness of the expectation, like 
other aspects of the printed publication inquiry, must be analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis.131  For example, a simple disclaimer may be 
reasonable for a small audience where the inventor can monitor copying, 
but unreasonable for large groups that cannot be effectively policed. 
In a report to the Secretary of Commerce on the basis for the 
§ 102(b) grace period, the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform 
noted that in academic science, “[l]ong and firmly established traditions 
. . . encourage open and free communication through early publication 
and dissemination of the results of scientific research.”132  A prohibition 
on taking notes is antithetical to scientific discourse because it would 
thwart openness, collegiality,133 and the “free flow of ideas.”134  Indeed, 
 
professional and behavioral norms entitle a party to a reasonable expectation that the information 
displayed will not be copied, we are more reluctant to find something a ‘printed publication.’”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  “Where parties have taken steps to prevent the public from copying temporarily 
posted information, the opportunity for others to appropriate that information and assure its 
widespread public accessibility is reduced.”  Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d. at 1350 (“The determination of whether a reference is a ‘printed 
publication’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.”) (citing In re 
Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 132. Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Report to the 
Secretary of Commerce 47 (1992). 
 133. “Collegiality” is a subjective term that has been defined as “the capacity to relate well and 
constructively to the comparatively small bank of scholars on whom the ultimate fate of the 
university rests.”  Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 514 (4th Cir. 1981) (introducing “collegiality” 
into higher education case law as a legitimate criterion for promotion and tenure), cert. denied, 459 
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taking notes and asking questions define what it means to “actively 
participate” in a seminar.  Scientists copy slides and take notes not only 
to understand complex schemes,135 but also to generate ideas for their 
own research.136  Therefore, although protective measures would allay 
the patentability-related fears of many TTOs, professors might view any 
university patent policy that mandates protective measures as stifling 
scholarship or as an intrusion into academic freedom.  At the very least, 
prohibiting note taking would adversely affect the collegial interchange 
and the open flow of ideas between the inventor and his peers.137  Thus, 
protective measures would significantly alter the way professors talk 
about science.138 
 
U.S. 830 (1982).  See also Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, The Role of Collegiality in 
Higher Education Tenure, Promotion, and Termination Decisions, 27 J.C. & U.L. 833, 834 (2001) 
(“While most institutions do not specify collegiality as a distinct criterion for tenure or promotion, 
many include within the teaching or service components a requirement that the candidate ‘work 
well with colleagues,’ ‘demonstrate good academic citizenship,’ or ‘contribute to a collegial 
atmosphere.’”); FRANKLIN SILVERMAN, COLLEGIALITY AND SERVICE FOR TENURE AND BEYOND: 
ACQUIRING A REPUTATION AS A TEAM PLAYER vii (Praeger Publishers 2003) (providing assistant 
professors and graduate students contemplating an academic career with practical information that 
will help them meet collegiality and service expectations for promotion and tenure). 
 134. Some commentators argue that university technology transfer compromises faculty and 
stifles the free flow of ideas: 
Another matter of concern commonly raised by critics of university technology transfer 
is that the free flow of ideas in the academic world is stifled by the focus on 
commercialization of inventions and innovations.  Many in the academic community 
insist that it is imperative that discoveries are published immediately and that 
information is shared openly.  Companies that work with university researchers, on the 
other hand, often demand delays in the publication and sharing of discoveries and ideas.  
In order to protect the value of proprietary information, it is often necessary to avoid 
publication, or other forms of sharing of information and data, until proper intellectual 
property protection is in place. 
Gordon, supra note 10, at 648 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 135. See, e.g., J. Gregory Trafton & Susan B. Trickett, Note-Taking for Self-Explanation and 
Problem Solving, in 16 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 1, 4 (2001) (“One strategy that may help 
learners as they solve problems is taking notes.  Note-taking is a very general strategy that has been 
well studied in a number of traditional learning environments . . . .”). 
 136. What a scientist hears in a lecture can lead to major discoveries: 
An accidental observation followed by a little detective work has led to the discovery [of 
a novel organic synthetic pathway] . . . .  [Professor Josef Michl] happened to hear a 
lecture by Timothy Clark of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, in Germany, in 
which he mentioned in passing a prediction he had made in a computational paper in 
1986 . . . .  “A bulb lit in my brain . . . .”  [And, interestingly,] no one seems to have 
pursued Clark’s idea . . . . 
Steve Ritter, New Radical Route To Polyolefins: Weakly Solvated “Naked” Li+ Promotes Novel 
Radical Polymerization of Alkenes, CHEMICAL & ENG’G NEWS, Apr. 24, 2006, at 11, available at 
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/84/i17/8417notw4.html. 
 137. Cf.  Ricks, supra note 15, (“This extra need for precautions may have repercussions on the 
amount of ‘open and free communication’ in the scientific community.”). 
 138. The Federal Circuit did not envision this conclusion.  See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss3/3
SEYMOREFINAL.DOC 4/23/2007  9:25:31 AM 
2007] “PRINTED PUBLICATION” BAR AFTER KLOPFENSTEIN 517 
E.  The “Ease of Copying” Factor 
Here, the court determines the ease or simplicity with which a 
member of the audience can copy the display.139  “The more complex a 
display, the more difficult it will be for members of the public to 
effectively capture its information,” but “[t]he simpler a display is, the 
more likely members of the public could learn it by rote or take notes 
adequate enough for later reproduction.”140  To evaluate complexity, the 
court considers both the substantive content of the reference and, in the 
case of lecture slides, the content of each slide.141  In Klopfenstein, the 
court found that only eight out of fourteen slides contained substantive 
information.142  Of this number, “only a few slides presented would have 
needed to have been copied by an observer to capture the novel 
information presented by the slides,”143 and each of these slides 
contained no more than three short bullets.144  Thus, “the reference itself 
was presented in such a way that copying of the information it contained 
would have been a relatively simple undertaking for those to whom it 
was exposed . . . .”145 
The way that a reference is presented during a research talk is 
trivial for purposes of comprehension or copying.  Research talks are 
such a fundamental forum for scientific discourse that the ordinary Ph.D. 
scientist can copy or “capture the novel information presented by the 
slides”146 with little or no difficulty.147  To be sure, scientists can extract 
 
1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[The court’s reluctance to find that a reference is a printed publication 
if the inventor has a reasonable expectation that the information will not be copied] helps preserve 
the incentive for inventors to participate in academic presentations or discussions.”). 
 139. Id. (explaining the fourth factor). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. at 1351 (“The Liu reference was made up of 14 separate slides.  One slide was a 
title slide; one was an acknowledgement slide; and four others represented graphs and charts of 
experiment results.  The other eight slides contained [substantive] information presented in bullet 
point format . . . .”). 
 143. Id. at 1351-52. 
 144. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[The eight substantive slides 
contained] no more than three bullet points to a slide.  Further, no bullet point was longer than two 
concise sentences.”). 
 145. Id. at 1352. 
 146. Id. at 1351-52. 
 147. Scientists tend to follow certain rules of thumb when preparing visual aids, which include: 
(1) not exceeding 20% of the total slide area with text; (2) limiting a slide to five lines with no more 
than five words per line (the “5 × 5 rule”); (3) using a large, conservative font; (4) conveying no 
more than one idea per slide; (5) avoiding more than one slide per minute of talk; and (6) less is 
better.  See Kane, supra note 108 (explaining how to prepare well-designed slide presentation); 
Zink, supra note 111 (same); Schoeberl, supra note 27 (same). 
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substantive information even if the inventor delivers a sloppy talk.  
When a speaker displays a “busy” slide, he will usually take extra time 
to explain it.148  If he does not, a member of the audience will seek 
clarification immediately or during the question-and-answer period.149  
In short, an attendee rarely leaves a research talk with unanswered 
questions.150  Therefore, slide complexity is unimportant. 
F.  Balancing 
Application and balancing of the four factors show that the 
traditional scientific research talk cannot survive a Klopfenstein analysis.  
Although the display of each substantive slide during a talk is fleeting, a 
scientist of ordinary skill in the art need not view a slide for an extended 
period of time to extract the novel information.  Copying is a normal and 
relatively simple undertaking, and restrictions on note taking are 
uncommon.  Even if a disclaimer would preclude note taking, many 
scientists can remember novelty without handwritten notes.  Thus, any 
visual aids displayed during most research talks are probably 
“sufficiently publicly accessible to count as a ‘printed publication’ under 
§ 102(b).”151 
V.  LOOKING FORWARD 
In order to avoid the § 102(b) statutory bar and to “assure that a 
potential invention be afforded the greatest opportunity to obtain the full 
protection available under the patent laws of various countries and 
multinational treaties,”152 an inventor should work with a patent 
professional and file a patent application before public disclosure.153  
 
 148. See supra Part IV.B (describing the factors that determine how long each slide is 
displayed). 
 149. See sources cited supra notes 93, 95, 96, 107-110, 146-147 (describing the question-and-
answer period). 
 150. Many presenters will “hang around” after the talk to answer remaining questions or to 
elaborate on the research in greater detail. 
 151. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 152. AVERY N. GOLDSTEIN, Preface to PATENT LAW FOR SCIENTISTS & ENGINEERS, vi (Avery 
N. Goldstein ed., Taylor & Francis 2005). 
 153. See, e.g., Rothenberg, supra note 11 (“To avoid the creation of a statutory bar to 
patentability by a scientific presentation, the most desirable course of action is the filing of a patent 
application . . . prior to the presentation.”).  Filing after the statutory grace period can initiate a 
disastrous chain of events, as one patent attorney explains: 
It could be bad, and it could be very, very bad.  At a minimum, people potentially or 
actually concerned with your patent, whether as licensees, infringers, or investors, will 
discover this pre-critical date activity and think your patent’s value is very questionable.  
At worst, [if an accused infringer can prove inequitable conduct], the accused infringer 
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Applying for a patent, however, is a long and tedious process because a 
patent attorney often requires months to search the prior art, to draft 
claims, and to file the requisite documents with the USPTO.154  
Moreover, considering the requisite back-and-forth correspondence with 
the USPTO,155 prosecuting a patent that withstands litigation156 is a slow, 
expensive process, which often takes years.157 
A.  A Possible Solution: The Provisional Patent Application 
1.  Overview 
As an alternative to an ordinary application, the Patent Act now 
allows an inventor to file a provisional application with the USPTO.158  
A provisional application allows an inventor to establish priority to an 
invention by submitting a specification, drawing, and a minimal filing 
fee.159  A provisional application requires no claims160 and is not 
examined.161  The inventor must, however, submit a regular, 
 
could win an award entitling it to have you pay its attorney fees, and . . . having won on 
the patent claim, now has a good antitrust claim [which might make you liable for treble 
damages]. 
Roberta J. Morris, Inventor Actions That Can Jeopardize Patent Rights, in PATENT LAW FOR 
SCIENTISTS & ENGINEERS 49, 51 (Avery N. Goldstein ed., Taylor & Francis 2005). 
 154. See generally IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
BEFORE THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE (4th ed. 2006). 
 155. See id.; DURHAM, supra note 58 (explaining the patent prosecution process). 
 156. See Jennifer Gordon, Preparing & Prosecuting a Patent That Holds Up In Litigation, 804 
PLI/Pat 991, 997 (2004) (“Clients, who rarely budget to prosecute patent applications ‘to the hilt,’ 
should be encouraged to heed the old adage, ‘An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.’  
Relatively simple measures taken during the preparation and prosecution of a patent may pay huge 
dividends in the future.”). 
 157. See sources cited supra notes 154-55. 
 158. Provisional applications have only existed in the U.S. patent laws since 1994.  That year, 
Congress amended the Patent Act “to bring the United States into closer harmony with prevailing 
international patent laws.”  Brian I. Marcus, Provisional Patent Applications, Their Practical Uses 
& Potential Pitfalls, 835 PLI/Pat 147, 151 (2005).  “As a part of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, the Patent Statute was amended to allow applicants for United States patents to file provisional 
applications that could provide the priority date for a non-provisional utility application filed within 
one year of the provisional.”  New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 
1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2000)). 
 159. A provisional application shall include “a specification as prescribed by [35 U.S.C. § 112 
¶1]; and a drawing as prescribed by section 113 . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1).  “The application 
must be accompanied by the fee required by law.”  Id. § 111(b)(3)(A). 
 160. “A claim, as required by the second through fifth paragraphs of section 112, shall not be 
required in a provisional application.”  Id. § 111(b)(2). 
 161. But see infra Part V.A.2 (describing how a provisional patent application that does not 
meet the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 may prove fatal to the patentee). 
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“nonprovisional” application within one year, or the provisional is 
automatically abandoned.162  Filing a provisional application gives the 
inventor several strategic advantages, including extending the patent 
term to twenty-one years,163 postponing the examination period,164 
trolling for prior art,165 and avoiding an allegation of inequitable 
conduct.166 
2.  Fulfilling the Statutory Requirements 
Although the provisional application provides inventors with an 
easy and inexpensive mode of entry into the U.S. patent system, the 
provisional application must satisfy the statutory requirements of 35 
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,167 in order for the nonprovisional 
 
 162. “[A non-provisional application disclosed] in a provisional application filed under section 
111(b) . . . shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the 
provisional application filed under section 111(b) . . . if the [non-provisional application] is filed not 
later than 12 months after the date on which the provisional application was filed . . . .”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 119(e)(1). 
 163. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 158, at 164 (“[B]y waiting the full year to file the 
nonprovisional application, applicants may effectively extend their patent term to twenty-one years.  
While the extra year will be of little value in many instances, certain patents, such as pharmaceutical 
and pioneering patents, often generate significant revenues for their owners until they expire and the 
extra year could prove very valuable.”). 
 164. Deferring examination “postpones the costs and perhaps risks of early examination of a 
nonprovisional application” by allowing the inventor “to seek financial assistance for patent 
prosecution or product development, while having the security of a patent application on file with 
the PTO.”  Charles E. Van Horn, Practicalities and Potential Pitfalls When Using Provisional 
Patent Applications, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 259, 297 (1994).  Furthermore, “[a]pplicants are more likely to 
have a better idea of any commercial goals relative to the described invention and are better able to 
draft claims that define the scope of the invention consistent with the commercial outlook.”  Id. 
 165. This strategy removes up to a year of patent-defeating prior art: 
At the time the first application regarding given subject matter is filed, the applicant will 
likely be unaware of the most recently-developed prior art.  There is a window of at least 
eighteen months immediately previous in which relevant prior art applications may have 
been filed but remain unpublished.  For applications not subject to publication, the 
window between their filing dates and issuance as patents is likely even longer.  
Accordingly, by the time a patent application is examined, significant previously 
unpublished unknown prior art may have manifested itself.  The prospect of being 
confronted with such prior art and being forced to responsively amend claims presents 
both the question of whether the application fortuitously contains the limitations needed 
to distinguish the prior art and the dark cloud of prosecution history estoppel even if such 
art can be distinguished.  To reduce this problem, even an application that could 
otherwise have been filed as a nonprovisional application may appropriately be filed as a 
provisional application. 
William B. Slate, In Defense of the Misunderstood Provisional Application, 85 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 219, 227 (2003). 
 166. This benefit obtains if the provisional application is filed before the disclosure.  See supra 
note 85 and accompanying text. 
 167. “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
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application to claim the benefit of the earlier filing date:168 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e), the written description and drawing(s) (if 
any) of the provisional application must adequately support and enable 
the subject matter claimed in the nonprovisional application that claims 
the benefit of the provisional application.  In New Railhead Mfg., 
L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co. [discussed infra)], the court held that for a 
nonprovisional application to be afforded the priority date of the 
provisional application, “the specification of the provisional must 
‘contain a written description of the invention and the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms,’ 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1, to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to 
practice the invention claimed in the nonprovisional application.” 
. . . . 
If a claim in the nonprovisional application is not adequately 
supported by the [disclosure in] the provisional application . . . that 
claim in the nonprovisional application is not entitled to the benefit of 
the filing date of the provisional application.169 
Obtaining the earliest filing date is extremely important because “it fixes 
or freezes the universe of prior art that can be used against the 
application.”170 
Those professors and TTOs who customarily file provisional 
applications without the “substantive” input of a competent patent 
attorney or agent jeopardize any benefits they may otherwise obtain 
from the provisional application.  Without competent advice, they often 
adopt a filing strategy that consists of stapling a cover sheet to a 
manuscript, journal article, research grant proposal, or another 
 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and 
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention.”  35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1 (2000).  Thus, the statutory requirement is threefold: enablement, 
best mode, and written description.  See generally DURHAM, supra note 58 (explaining the 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1). 
 168. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1) (2000) (“[A provisional] application shall include a 
specification as prescribed by [35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1] . . . .”). 
 169. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.11(I)(A) (8th ed., Rev. 4, Oct. 2005) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Therefore, a provisional application “must fully support the 
later filed non-provisional patent application.”  Shashank Upadhye, To Use or Not to Use: 
Reforming Patent Infringement, The Public Use Bar, and the Experimental Use Doctrine As Applied 
to Clinical Testing of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Inventions, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
1, 60 (2002). 
 170. Upadhye, supra note 169, at 60. 
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preexisting document.171  The ease of this practice also lays a potential 
trap for the unwary.172 
3.  The § 102(b) Statutory Bar 
A savvy inventor can use a provisional application and the § 102(b) 
grace period strategically to delay examination of a patent application.173  
However, this is not the typical case, as one patent attorney explains: 
Your client approaches you with a presentation he gave at a recent 
public conference relating to his new invention.  He’s not interested in 
foreign rights, but he would like to file the presentation now as a 
provisional patent application to preserve his rights in the U.S., and, in 
a year’s time, if he’s able to commercialize the invention, he would 
like to file a utility application claiming priority back to the filing date 
of the provisional application.174 
If a professor files a nonprovisional application after giving a 
 
 171. See Slate, supra note 165 at 220.  (“It is . . . not uncommon to see a provisional 
application take the form of a cover sheet attached to an existing document . . . .  Although such 
filings are often done in-house, they may also be done by outside patent counsel provided with the 
document and instructed to file it ‘as is.’”); Marcus, supra note 158, at 155 (“Universities and 
scientists availed themselves of provisional patent applications to file the text of speeches and 
academic papers.  Large businesses used provisional patent applications as a matter of course to file 
internal invention disclosure forms generated for inventions by their R&D staff.”).  This filing 
strategy has many drawbacks, which include a failure: (1) to “provide adequate support for the 
ultimately desired claims[;]” (2) to “use different generic terms of varying degrees of specificity 
which advantageously provide the basis for a chain of dependent claims[;]” and (3) to “provide the 
broad alternative examples necessary for broad claim interpretation under the Doctrine of 
Equivalents and of ‘means-plus-function’ elements under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).”  Slate, supra, at 220-
21. 
 172. Patent attorney Shashank Upadhye provides an example: 
[S]uppose a provisional patent application discloses subject matter X.  Within one year, 
the applicant files a non-provisional patent application disclosing and claiming subject 
matters X + Y.  Subject matter X has the provisional filing date and subject matter Y has 
the new filing date.  Here, the non-provisional application contains new matter that was 
not taught in the provisional. 
Upadhye, supra note 169, at 60-61. 
 173. For example: 
Any entity may benefit from the provisional patent application process.  . . .  [For 
example], if one were to assume that the [§ 102(b) triggering event occurred] on Month 
0, the inventor would have until Month 12 to file a provisional patent application (or 
non-provisional patent application for that matter) because of the § 102(b) one-year 
grace period.  Then, because the inventor now has a patent application on file, the 
inventor can publicly use, sell, demonstrate, or publish the invention.  The caveat is that 
the inventor must file the corresponding non-provisional application by Month 24—
within twelve months of the provisional application filing date. 
Id. at 56-57 (footnotes omitted). 
 174. Marcus, supra note 158, at 151. 
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research talk, the professor may lose all patent rights if he mistakenly 
believes that the disclosure in the provisional application adequately 
supports the invention.175 
In New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co.,176 New 
Railhead sued Vermeer for infringing a drill bit.177  The patented drill bit 
claimed priority to a provisional application.178  The parties did not 
dispute that commercial embodiments of the drill bit were sold more 
than one year before New Railhead filed the nonprovisional application, 
which triggered the § 102(b) clock.179  If the patent was not afforded the 
earlier priority date, § 102(b) would bar patentability.180  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding that the specification and 
drawings in the provisional application did not adequately support the 
claims in the issued patent.181  Accordingly, the court held that the patent 
was invalid under § 102(b).182 
A similar result would obtain if a professor makes a public 
disclosure before filing a provisional application.  Conversely, if the 
professor files the provisional application before giving a research talk 




 175. Shashank Upadhye provides another hypothetical: 
[S]uppose an inventor on Month 0 publicly used the invention of X + Y.  On Month 12, 
the inventor filed a provisional patent application teaching only X or insufficiently 
describing Y in the necessary detail.  On Month 24, the inventor files the non-provisional 
patent application claiming X + Y.  The patent issues.  Now, an infringer may defend on 
the grounds that the claim to X + Y is invalid because the subject matter Y has a filing 
date of Month 24, and the public use of X + Y occurred almost 2 years earlier (i.e., 
Month 0).  While any claim to subject matter X only could chain its way from Month 24 
to Month 12 properly, the subject matter Y chain stops at Month 24.  So, the failure to 
adequately describe subject matter Y in the provisional means that it cannot serve as an 
anchor to subject matter Y in the later non-provisional application. 
Upadhye, supra note 169, at 61. 
 176. New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 177. Id. at 1292. 
 178. Id. at 1293. 
 179. Id. at 1294.  In other words, the sale occurred before the critical date.  See id. 
 180. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“[An inventor cannot obtain a patent if] the invention was 
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale 
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States . . . .”). 
 181. New Railhead, 298 F.3d at 1299.  See discussion supra Part V.A.2. 
 182. Id. 
 183. In this case, even if the provisional application is statutorily deficient, the nonprovisional 
would be filed within the § 102(b) grace period.  So, although the patentee would not obtain the 
benefit of the provisional filing date, there is no § 102(b) statutory bar to patentability. 
31
Seymore: "Printed Publication" Bar After Klopenstein
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
SEYMOREFINAL.DOC 4/23/2007  9:25:31 AM 
524 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:493 
B.  Is the Conflict Best Resolved Through Changes in Management 
Rather Than Through Amendments to the Patent Act? 
The extent to which professors will even consider patentability 
before publicly disclosing research depends on several factors.  First, 
universities that engage in technology transfer should train their science 
and engineering faculty in the basic tenets of the patent laws.184  
Scientists and engineers “practicing their craft now must be aware of 
how patent rights are woven through the research process.”185  Without 
proper patent protection, a breakthrough discovery “may never reach the 
public, since investment in the discovery cannot be justified if there is 
not a time of exclusivity to recoup the cost of investment capital.”186  If 
this is done, TTOs could prevent most inadvertent § 102(b) triggering 
events. 
Second, a professor is more likely to think about patentability 
concerns if he has a stake in the outcome, financial or otherwise.  In the 
eyes of the professor’s colleagues, tenure and promotion committees, 
and the world of academic science in general, “[p]eer-reviewed 
publications in archival research journals are the most important 
measure of the significance of any research activity.”187  Indeed, most 
universities will admit that technology transfer “is a business of home 
runs,”188 so “[e]xcept in a few cases, where institutions have earned tens 
of millions of dollars from a single invention, licensing income makes 
up a tiny percentage of an institution’s revenue base.”189  Therefore, it is 
unrealistic for a university to expect a tenure-track professor to delay 
disclosure in order for the TTO to assess potential licensing 
opportunities for his research if the university will most likely not seek 
patent protection.190 
 
 184. See sources cited, supra note 2. 
 185. Goldstein, supra note 152, at v. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Boston Univ. College of Engineering Faculty Expectations, supra note 42, at § 2.1.  See 
also New Mexico State University Guidelines, supra note 42, § I.  (“Publication in refereed 
scholarly journals precedes other evidence of professional stature.”). 
 188. Charlotte Crystal, U.Va. Patent Foundation Upgrades Operations to Better Serve Faculty 
Inventors and Commercial Clients, INSIDE UVA ONLINE, Sept. 10-16, 1999, 
http://www.virginia.edu/insideuva/1999/28/patent.html (quoting Robert MacWright, Executive 
Director). 
 189. Goldie Blumenstyk, Deflated Deals: Universities End Up With Worthless Equity When 
Companies Created in Licensing Deals Go Under, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED., May 9, 2003, 
at A27, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v49/i35/35a02702.html. 
 190. To the extent that professors are more willing to share their ideas with faculty colleagues 
rather than an administrator, each science department or college within the university could 
designate a professor trained in patent law fundamentals who could make a cursory review of a 
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Third, universities should nurture the entrepreneurial spirit among 
their research faculty because university inventor-entrepreneurs are 
keenly aware of the patent laws.191  This can be done by: (1) Hosting 
“how-to” seminars; (2) Highlighting successful faculty entrepreneurs on 
campus; (3) Recruiting successful entrepreneurs to join the faculty; (4) 
Encouraging professors to start university-sponsored incubators or start-
ups;192 and (5) Rewarding entrepreneurial activities with release time 
and due credit for tenure and promotion. 
Therefore § 102(b) conerns in the academic context are best 
handled through managerial decision making, not through changing the 
patent laws.  Admittedly, some commentators view Klopfenstein as a 
departure from prior case law that “holds serious implications for future 
applications of the printed publication bar.”193  In her Note applying 
Klopfenstein to conference presentations, Cindy Ricks argues that the 
court’s adoption of the “protective measures” and “ease of copying” 
factors is flawed because the reasoning to prevent note taking and rote 
memorization, respectively “would apply with equal force to purely oral 
presentations . . . .”194  Moreover, she argues, because an entirely oral 
presentation does not trigger § 102(b) as a matter of law,195 “it is not 
clear why these factors should cause a slide or poster presentation to be 
considered a printed publication.”196 
Ricks’ argument is not without force.  Dissemination and 
accessibility are the keys to the legal determination of whether a 
reference is published,197 so arguably members of the public that have a 
deep interest in the substance of the talk could extract the key elements 
of the invention with or without visual aids.198  However, Ricks’ 
 
professor’s disclosure.  If this professor sees promise, he could refer the inventor to the TTO for a 
more in-depth review. 
 191. See generally UNIVERSITY SPIN-OFF COMPANIES: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FACULTY 
ENTREPRENEURS, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (Alistair M. Brett et al. eds., 1991) (discussing the 
role of spin-off companies in commercializing university technology). 
 192. See id. 
 193. Ricks, supra note 15, at 865.  “The Klopfenstein court’s interpretation of ‘public 
dissemination’ and ‘public accessibility’ as meaning, essentially, made known to the interested 
public for a few days, appears inconsistent with the interpretation of those terms in previous cases.”  
Id. at 862. 
 194. Id. at 863. 
 195. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1349 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is important to 
note than an entirely oral presentation at a scientific conference that includes neither slides nor 
copies of the presentation is without question not a ‘printed publication’ for the purposes of 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b).”). 
 196. Ricks, supra note 15, at 863. 
 197. See Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348. 
 198. “In particular, there seems to be very little difference between an audience member’s 
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argument fails for two reasons.  First, purely oral presentations are 
essentially nonexistent in academic research talks.199  Second, at its core, 
§ 102(b) is a loss-of-right provision that statutorily bars the applicant 
from obtaining a patent because of the inventor’s own actions.200  To the 
extent that visual aids make a presentation easier to copy, photograph, or 
remember, they also make the presentation more accessible and easier to 
disseminate to the interested public.201  Thus, the distinction between an 
oral presentation and a slide presentation is a difference in degree rather 
than a difference in kind.  Therefore, the Klopfenstein court properly 
focused the § 102(b) inquiry on the inventor’s conduct, which is wholly 
consistent with the well-settled policy that “prior public disclosure of the 
substance of an invention serves as the most fundamental bar to the 
ability of an inventor to obtain patent protection.”202 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Would-be infringers target university patents because faculty 
inventors are more likely to make inadvertent disclosures than are 
industrial inventors.203  As Professor Durham notes, the § 102(b) printed 
publication bar provides a straightforward challenge to patent validity 
“because it relies on the easily determined critical date of the patent 
application, rather than the often difficult to determine date of 
invention.”204  In Klopfenstein, the Federal Circuit did not broaden the 
scope of a “printed publication,” but instead emphasized that the public 
accessibility and dissemination inquiries will rest on substance rather 
than form.  The focus of the § 102(b) inquiry remains on the inventor, 
who should lose the right to patent his invention if he makes a public 
disclosure.  To the extent that tension exists between patenting and 
 
ability to take notes at an oral presentation accompanied by slides and a presentation that is ‘entirely 
oral.’”  Ricks, supra note 15, at 867 n.129. 
 199. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 200. See cases cited supra notes 54, 56 (discussing the policy behind the § 102(b) statutory 
bar).  See also supra Part III.A (same). 
 201. In other words, in terms of reasonableness, an inventor who uses visual aids, in the 
absence of protective measures, can reasonably expect the audience to copy or remember what they 
have seen.  This expectation is less reasonable for a purely oral presentation. 
 202. Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Report to the 
Secretary of Commerce 47 (1992). 
 203. “[The Federal Circuit’s decision in Klopfenstein] doesn’t surprise me, because in the drug 
industry there’s no way that we would show a poster on anything before the patent application had 
been filed.  We err on the side of caution.”  Web Log posting of Derek Lowe, Keep It To Yourself, 
to http://pipeline.corante.com/archives/patents_and_ip (Nov. 15, 2004) (discussing Klopfenstein). 
 204. DURHAM, supra note 58, at 118.  See also 2 HORWITZ & HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: 
PROCEDURE & TACTICS §§ 6.03, 605 (2006); supra text accompanying note 9. 
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publishing research, the tension can be resolved through incentives and 
managerial decision making, not through an amendment to the Patent 
Act to protect university inventors.205  
 
 205. In her Note criticizing Klopfenstein, Cindy Ricks argues that: 
Congress should take action and redraft the statute to unambiguously return to the 
standard articulated in previous case law, under which copies of a reference must be 
either actually distributed to the public or else placed where the public has continued 
access to them, in order for the reference to constitute a printed publication. 
Ricks, supra note 15, at 866 (citation omitted).  Also, “the general confusion in the case law 
regarding the printed publication requirement suggests that Congress should redraft the statute to 
reflect modern technologies used for disseminating information.”  Id. 
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